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Construction of new BioSafety Level (BSL) 3 and 4 lab-
oratories has raised concerns regarding provision of care 
to exposed workers because of healthcare worker (HCW) 
unfamiliarity with precautions required. When the National 
Institutes of Health began construction of a new BSL-4 labo-
ratory in Hamilton, Montana, USA, in 2005, they contracted 
with St. Patrick Hospital in Missoula, Montana, for care of 
those exposed. A care and isolation unit is described. We 
developed a training program for HCWs that emphasized 
the optimal use of barrier precautions and used pathogen-
speciﬁ   c modules and simulations with mannequins and 
ﬂ  uorescent liquids that represented infectious body ﬂ  uids. 
The facility and training led to increased willingness among 
HCWs to care for patients with all types of communicable 
diseases. This model may be useful for other hospitals, 
whether they support a BSL-4 facility, are in the proximity of 
a BSL-3 facility, or are interested in upgrading their facilities 
to prepare for exotic and novel infectious diseases. 
O
ver the past decade, biomedical research performed on 
agents of viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) has sub-
stantially increased. These agents are members of several 
virus groups, including ﬁ  loviruses (Ebola virus, Marburg 
virus), Old World arenaviruses (Lassa virus, Lujo virus), 
New World arenaviruses (Machupo virus, Junin virus, 
Sabia virus, Guanarito virus, Chapare virus), ﬂ  aviviruses 
(Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus, Kyasanur Forest disease 
virus), and bunyaviruses (Crimean–Congo hemorrhagic 
fever virus, Rift Valley fever virus) (1). Work with these 
agents is performed in specialized containment laborato-
ries, operating at either BioSafety Level (BSL) 3 or BSL-4. 
BSL-3 denotes the potential for aerosol transmission to the 
laboratory worker. An agent that also is associated with 
high lethality and for which no available vaccine or speciﬁ  c 
treatment exists is studied at BSL-4 (2). Many VHF agents 
have a demonstrated potential for person-to-person trans-
mission, including in nosocomial settings. A recent exam-
ple of person-to-person transmission to hospital personnel 
occurred in September and October 2008 when Lujo virus 
was transmitted from the index patient to a paramedic, 2 
nurses, and a member of the janitorial staff. Barrier precau-
tions were not in place at the time of these events (3).
To provide safe work settings in which to study these 
pathogens, several BSL-4 laboratories are either in opera-
tion or under construction in the United States and abroad 
(Table 1) (T.G. Ksiazek, pers. comm.). Operation and man-
agement of these facilities are characterized by redundant 
engineering of safety features, strict administrative over-
sight, biosecurity measures, and extensive training (2,4), all 
designed to reduce the risk for exposure to persons working 
in this environment and prevent agents from being released 
into the community. Despite these safeguards, researchers 
in the United States and abroad have, on occasion, sustained 
occupational exposures to such agents, which rarely have 
resulted in overt illness and death (Table 2) (5–11). Be-
cause of the potential for person-to-person transmission of 
many VHF agents, rendering care to exposed or ill persons 
requires considerations beyond the scope of traditional hos-
pital practices. Contact and/or airborne isolation guidelines 
may need to be added to standard isolation over the course 
of a patient’s hospitalization (12,13).
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On several occasions, persons naturally infected with 
a VHF agent have sought treatment at hospitals located in 
industrialized areas of the world (14–21). Often the correct 
diagnosis is not considered at the time of hospitalization, 
and only standard isolation is used until such time as the 
diagnosis is suspected or conﬁ  rmed. Despite this limitation, 
nosocomial transmission of these agents is uncommon in 
adequately resourced hospitals (16,18,20,21). Notably, the 
medical care requirements for patients with a naturally ac-
quired VHF illness are identical to those needed for labora-
tory-acquired infections with the same agents.
Because of the limited and unique settings in which 
BSL-4 research has historically taken place in the United 
States, hospitalization for occupational exposures to VHF   
agents has typically been a dedicated facility remote from 
a conventional hospital, e.g., the medical containment 
suite (the “slammer”) at the US Army Medical Research 
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Frederick, 
Maryland, USA, or the biocontainment patient care unit at 
Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.  The beneﬁ  ts of 
a remote facility include reducing the risk for nosocomial 
transmission, use of personnel who are already trained in 
managing a patient in containment, and control of public 
access (22). However, this approach has several serious 
drawbacks, including limited access to medical specialties 
and nursing staff, limited availability of medications and 
blood products, and limited access to specialized equip-
ment such as ventilators and hemodialysis machines. In 
addition, increased psychological stress is experienced by 
patients conﬁ  ned to such a facility. Finally, given that the 
need to activate these facilities is extremely rare, the ex-
pense of building and maintaining a stand-alone unit poses 
a substantial limitation to this approach.
In addition to physical separation of the facility, medi-
cal and support staff at the USAMRIID facility work in 
positive pressure suits similar to those used in the labora-
tories themselves (22). Although the use of such suits pro-
vides protection to the caregiver, positive pressure suits are 
cumbersome, physically demanding to work in, and require 
substantial time for donning and dofﬁ  ng (dressing and un-
dressing).  Furthermore, venipuncture and other interven-
tions in this unaccustomed and inconvenient setting pose a 
clear exposure risk to healthcare workers (HCWs). These 
factors are serious drawbacks when a HCW needs to render 
care to an acutely ill patient.
Documented clinical experience from several situa-
tions clearly indicates that nosocomial transmission can be 
prevented by implementing standard, contact, and airborne 
isolation procedures (3,15,16,19,,20). Furthermore, all 
BSL-4 research programs stress the importance of recog-
nizing and quickly reporting potential work-related expo-
sures and illnesses to occupational medical and safety staff. 
Thus, healthcare staff will typically be informed about the 
speciﬁ  c agent and the nature of the exposure early in the 
incubation period. This will enable rapid evaluation and 
timely institution of appropriate isolation precautions.
Given all these considerations, what additional en-
hancements are really necessary for a hospital to safely 
care for patients while still enabling delivery of optimum 
medical care? Because of sensational misconceptions about 
VHF  agents in popular media such as movies and the press, 
other serious issues are the willingness of HCWs to render 
care to such persons and how to determine what additional 
actions would increase the likelihood of their doing so. We 
offer a practical approach to dealing with these issues in the 
procedures followed by a patient isolation facility located 
in Missoula, Montana, USA, and its attendant training and 
educational components.
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Table 1. BSL-4 laboratories planned or operational, 2009*
Location Status
United States 
  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,  
  Atlanta, GA, USA 
A
  Georgia State University Viral Immunology  
 Center,  Atlanta 
A
  Boston University National Emerging Infectious 
  Disease Laboratories, Boston, MA, USA 
NA
  United States Army Medical Research Institute  
  of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, MD, USA 
A
  Department of Homeland Security National  
  Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures  
  Center, Frederick, MD, USA 
NA
  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious  
 Diseases 
  Integrated  Research  Facility,  Frederick  NA
  Rocky  Mountain  Laboratories,  Hamilton,  MT, 
  USA 
A
  Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research,
  San Antonio, TX, USA 
A
  University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, 
 TX,  USA 
    Robert E. Shope MD BSL-4 Laboratory  A
    Galveston National Biocontainment  
  Laboratory 
A
Other countries 
  Geelong, Victoria, Australia  A
  Winnipeg, Ontario, Canada  A
 Taiwan  NA
  London and Salisbury, UK  A, A 
 Lyon,  France  A
 Libreville,  Gabon  A
  Hamburg, Marburg, Berlin, and Greifswald,  
 Germany 
A, A, A, NA
 Pune,  India  NA
 Rome,  Italy  A
  Bilthoven, the Netherlands  A
 Novosibirsk,  Russia  A
  Sandringham, South Africa  NA
 Solna,  Sweden  A
  Geneva and Spiez, Switzerland  A, NA 
*BSL-4, BioSafety Level 4; A, active; NA, nonactive. Exposures to Agents in BSL-3 and BSL-4
Care and Isolation Unit 
The Division of Intramural Research of the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) re-
cently completed construction of an integrated research 
facility with BSL-4 research space at its Rocky Mountain 
Laboratories (RML) in Hamilton, Montana. As part of the 
project, NIAID contracted with St. Patrick Hospital and 
Health Sciences Center (SPH), a regional referral medi-
cal center located in Missoula, Montana, for provision and 
stafﬁ  ng of a patient isolation facility to support the RML 
BSL-4 research program. The facility, known as a care and 
isolation unit (CIU) (23) was designed to care for RML 
workers who had either known or had potential exposure 
to, or illness from, work-related diseases. The facility had to 
be located within 75 miles of RML, had to provide the full 
range of standard in-patient care, including intensive care, 
and had to meet the facility design guidelines of the Nation-
al Institutes of Health, Division of Occupational Health and 
Safety (NIH DOHS) (24). Furthermore, the hospital had to 
supply the personnel to provide the full range of medical 
and nursing care and to be able to accept a patient within 8 
hours (this would entail notiﬁ  cation of key members of the 
hospital hierarchy, transferring patients if the rooms were 
currently occupied, securing adequate nursing and support 
staff, and carrying out systems checks to ensure that air 
handling systems and autoclaves were operational). In ad-
dition to the physical facility, a training program for critical 
care nurses, physicians, and other medical personnel was a 
major component of the contract.
To satisfy the NIH requirements for the CIU, the fol-
lowing elements were needed: 1) access control, i.e., the 
ability to restrict entrance into the CIU to authorized per-
sons only; 2) three separate stand-alone rooms, each with 
a bathroom and shower, separate air handling, and an an-
teroom separating the patient room from the hallway; 3) 
directional air ﬂ  ow from the hallway into the anteroom and 
from the anteroom into the patient room; 4) a dedicated 
exhaust system providing >12 air exchanges per hour to the 
patient rooms (including >2 outside air changes per hour); 
5) passage of exhaust through a HEPA ﬁ  lter to the building 
exterior >8 feet above the rooftop and well removed from 
air intake ducts; 6) room surfaces constructed of seamless 
materials amenable to topical disinfection; 7) the capability 
for the full range of  intensive care unit (ICU) monitor-
ing and support, including the ability to perform limited 
surgery, hemodialysis or peritoneal dialysis, Swan-Ganz 
catheter placement, and hemodynamic monitoring; and 8) 
a separate autoclave within the CIU for sterilizing all items 
that come out of a patient room.
SPH was selected to provide these services and facili-
ties. SPH is a not-for-proﬁ  t medical center under the spon-
sorship of the Sisters of Providence. It has 195 acute care 
beds, and >10,000 patient admissions per year. The full 
range of standard specialty medical care is available within 
the hospital, including 24 hour, 7 day/week availability of 
specialists in critical care, infectious disease, and all surgi-
cal subspecialties.
SPH retroﬁ  tted 3 adjacent rooms within the existing 
medical ICU (MICU) to create the CIU. A set of doors 
was installed to control access to the CIU from the MICU, 
and these would remain open when the CIU was not in use 
(Figure). A separate fully equipped nursing station was con-
structed, with closed circuit television monitoring for each of 
the 3 rooms. After construction, the CIU was inspected and 
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Table 2. Infections caused by laboratory exposure to hemorrhagic fever viruses* 
Virus Incident
Ebola Fingerstick while manipulating infected guinea pig tissue, 1977 (5); percutaneous exposure to 
blood from a Zaire Ebola virus–infected rodent, 2004 (7)
Marburg 3 laboratory acquired infections since the mid-1980s; 1 death occurred in Russia; no details 
available (8)
Crimean–Congo hemorrhagic fever  8 cases before 1980 compiled by SALS; no details available (9)
Lassa 1 case reported in 1970 with limited details provided (10)
Junin 21 cases before 1980 compiled by SALS; no details available (9)
Machupo 1 person exposed to aerosolized blood from a broken test tube (11)
*SALS, Subcommittee on Arbovirus Laboratory Safety. 
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Figure. Floor plan of the Care and Isolation Unit, St. Patrick Hospital 
and Health Sciences Center, Missoula, MT, USA.PERSPECTIVE
approved by ofﬁ  cials from NIH DOHS. Under normal cir-
cumstances, the CIU operates either as 3 conventional MICU 
rooms or as isolation rooms for patients with community-ac-
quired illnesses for which isolation of airborne pathogens is 
needed. If a patient from RML should require admission, any 
current occupants would be transferred, and access would be 
limited by closing off that section of the MICU.
In addition to the physical aspects of the CIU, several 
other elements were developed. Speciﬁ  c policies and pro-
cedures were written that deal with all aspects from admis-
sion to discharge, including unique aspects such as clean up 
of infected bodily spills, donning and dofﬁ  ng of personal 
protective equipment (PPE), and use of the autoclave. Sup-
port of hospital administration, physicians, nurses, and sup-
port personnel was critical. This backing was enlisted pri-
marily by mounting an educational campaign that stressed 
the true risk for nosocomial transmission of these agents, 
as well as the recognition that the increased resources that 
would be provided to the hospital could greatly enhance 
capacity for handling community-acquired infections.
One feature dealt with preparing the hospital staff to 
care for such exposed persons. To accomplish this feature, 
we developed a detailed curriculum, which can be pre-
sented during a 1-day training workshop. This workshop 
includes didactic information, patient care scenarios dis-
cussed in group settings, and hands-on training. Simulation 
of various patient care activities (hand hygiene, donning 
and dofﬁ  ng of PPE, cleanup of body ﬂ  uids, and rendering 
ICU level care to a patient) is conducted by using program-
mable mannequins and either tonic water or Glo Germ 
(Glo Germ, Moab, UT, USA), both of which ﬂ  uoresce 
under ultraviolet light, to simulate infectious body ﬂ  uids. 
Continuing education credits are granted for participation. 
Competence is maintained with quarterly demonstration of 
proper technique, review of CIU-speciﬁ  c policies and pro-
cedures, and required utilization of a series of online prob-
lem-oriented patient care scenarios. Training videos have 
been developed that demonstrate proper technique for spill 
cleanup, donning and dofﬁ  ng of PPE, processing of patient 
specimens, and processing of biohazardous waste, includ-
ing use of the autoclave. Finally, detailed educational mod-
ules have been developed for each of the BSL-4 pathogens. 
These modules are designed to provide a nurse, emergency 
medical technician, or critical care physician with critical 
information that is quickly accessible as well as an exten-
sive discussion of all aspects of the agent. The modules are 
in a standard format with extensive references and websites 
for further reading. All of this information is available for 
review any time both in hard copy as well as on the hospi-
tal’s intranet site in the form of slide presentations, videos, 
or PDF ﬁ  les. The SPH staff has been generous in supply-
ing feedback on the training and has been instrumental in 
reﬁ  ning the curriculum. Acquisition of knowledge has been 
documented with the use of pretesting and posttesting. After 
completion of the training, SPH staff members expressed 
increased conﬁ  dence in caring for patients with all types of 
communicable infectious diseases, including VHFs.
To maintain readiness, a series of drills and exercises 
have been performed and will continue, in collaboration 
with RML and local emergency medical services providers. 
These readiness exercises have encompassed all aspects of 
care from arrival to the hospital through discharge.
Discussion
Engineering and administrative controls as well as 
PPE and standard operating procedures that are in place 
in modern BSL-4 laboratories have been associated with a 
greatly reduced incidence of occupational exposures to in-
fectious agents (23,25). However, exposures, now primar-
ily by the percutaneous route, still occur. USAMRIID re-
cently published a review of potential laboratory exposures 
to agents of bioterrorism at their facility during 1989–2002 
(26). During that time, 12 evaluations were made for po-
tential exposures to ﬁ  loviruses (Ebola virus or Marburg 
virus), 3 to arenaviruses, and 4 to Crimean–Congo hem-
orrhagic fever virus. Although none of these incidents 
was deemed a high enough risk to warrant isolation of the 
exposed persons, 2 laboratory workers were given inves-
tigational antiviral agents. One exposure at USAMRIID 
in 2004 resulted in isolation when a scientist received a 
puncture injury through a gloved hand while manipulating 
a mouse that had been experimentally exposed to Ebola vi-
rus (22). Fortunately, none of these situations resulted in 
infection. However, workers have been infected by agents 
of VHF from laboratory accidents elsewhere (Table 2).
Nosocomial transmission of VHF is infrequently de-
scribed outside of resource-poor settings. With rare excep-
tion, such events have occurred because of the lack of rec-
ognition that the index patient had such an infection (3,18). 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has 
published guidelines for management of patients infected 
with viral hemorrhagic fevers in the conventional hospi-
tal setting (12,13). Notably, medical care has been safely 
rendered by using conventional barrier precautions alone 
to persons infected with VHF viruses, including Ebola vi-
rus (5,18), Marburg virus (19,20), Lassa fever virus (27), 
Machupo virus (11), Sabia virus (28), and Crimean–Congo 
hemorrhagic fever virus (21).
Nevertheless, even well-trained HCWs may make 
mistakes due to anxiety, fatigue, or other stressors, so addi-
tional facility enhancements that augment safety are desir-
able when dealing with potentially lethal infectious diseas-
es. Furthermore, the recognition of a patient with an exotic 
or unfamiliar contagious disease may engender trepidation 
among the medical community as well as the public. Such 
concerns have at times resulted in reluctance on the part 
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of HCWs to care for persons infected with such agents as 
monkeypox virus (29), Yersinia pestis (plague) (30), and 
others. When a sample of 1,000 physicians were surveyed 
(526 responses), 80% indicated a willingness to care for pa-
tients in the event of an outbreak of an unknown but poten-
tially deadly illness, but only 21% felt adequately prepared 
to do so (31). Reluctance is often out of proportion to the 
true risks and results from concerns for personal and fam-
ily member safety. These concerns are likely to be reduced 
if the HCW perceives that the facility has taken additional 
precautions and instituted additional training.
To maximize safety as well as to address provider con-
cerns of HCWs and other staff, we have developed the CIU 
and our accompanying training program. Our pragmatic 
and practical approach provides a well-designed facility 
that enhances safety not only for the care of a patient in-
fected with a laboratory-acquired VHF virus infection, but 
also for serious transmissible community-acquired disease 
or for exotic diseases contracted while traveling.
As international tourism and work assignments con-
tinue to expand, the importation of exotic diseases is almost 
certain to increase and to appear in unexpected locations. 
Recent instances of infection have occurred with Marburg 
virus in Colorado (19) and the Netherlands (20); with Lassa 
fever virus in New Jersey (15), the United Kingdom (16), 
and Germany 6 (16); with Y. pestis (32) in New York, New 
York; and with (initially thought) extensively drug-resis-
tant Mycobacterium tuberculosis in Atlanta, Georgia (33). 
Finally, in the United States, 1,356 BSL-3 laboratories 
are registered with either CDC or the US Department of 
Agriculture select agent programs (34). For these reasons, 
relatively low-cost facilities ($624,000.00 for design and 
construction of our unit) like the CIU may become more 
critical. Furthermore, training programs, similar to the 
one we have implemented, with emphasis on such practi-
cal infection control issues as the proper use of PPE, hand 
hygiene, and proper spill cleanup, has broad application. 
Other communities might consider the beneﬁ  ts of our ap-
proach, whether or not infectious disease research labora-
tories are constructed in their area.  
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